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CRIMINAL LAW: COMMITMENT AND RELEASE OF
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS ACQUITTED BY
REASON OF INSANITY
WHEN THE DEFENDANT in a criminal case is found not guilty by rea-
son of insanity,' a proper solution to his disposition seeks to satisfy three
possibly conflicting considerations. Society demands that dangerous
persons be prevented from causing further harm; legal tradition de-
mands that liberty be taken away only by due process of law5 modem
scientific knowledge demands that the psychiatric aspects of commit-
ment and release be given increased emphasis.
A District of Columbia statute2 provides that a defendant acquitted
solely on the ground of insanity at the time of the crime shall be indefi-
nitely committed to a public hospital for the mentally ill without a fur-
ther hearing. Theact provides for a release procedure which is initiated
by the hospital superintendent's certification that the former defendant
has recovered his sanity and will not be dangerous in the reasonable
future.3 The statute also stipulates that the confined person has the
right of habeas corpus.
Although the automatic commitment provision of this statute seems
to accord with the wishes of both the psychiatric profession and the
community at large,4 the question of its impingement on the constitu-
tional rights of the person confined was raised in a recent case, Ragsdale
v. Overholser.5 D, tried on a robbery charge, was found not guilty by
'The term "insanity" is used in this note when paraphrasing language of statutes
or judicial opinions, but the word has little medical meaning. Modern psychiatrists
unanimously prefer the term "mental illness" when speaking categorically. WEIHOFEN,
MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 5 (1954) Weihofen, The Definition of
Mental Illness, zi OHIO ST. L.J. x (596o).
2D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301 (Supp. 1958).
'The court, in its discretion, may hold a hearing on the mental condition of the
petitioner. D.C. CODE ANN. § ±4 -3 o(d) (Supp. x958).
'Prior to the case of Durham v. United States, 254 F.zd 86z (D.C. Cir. 1954),
the statute provided for commitment at the discretion of the trial judge. This decision
thoroughly displeased certain members of Congress and a committee investigated the
result of the Durham case and other recent decisions in the area of criminal insanity.
Despite the admitted fact that no case could be found in which the acquitted defendant
had not been committed, the committee concluded, in agreement with psychiatric testi-
mony, that "the public is entitled to know that ... such person shall be given a period
of hospitalization and treatment to guard against eminent recurrence of some criminal
act by that person." H.R. REP. No. 89z, 84 th Cong., ist Sess. 13 (.955).
5 z8S F.zd 943 (D.C. Cir. i96o).
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reason of insanity and was automatically confined under the above
statute. In petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus, D alternately pleaded
that his automatic commitment was unconstitutional or that if he were
correctly confined, he had recovered. On the commitment issue, he
argued that since the prosecution has the burden of proof on the issue
of insanity once raised,6 an acquittal by reason of insanity means only
that the prosecution has failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant was sane at the time of the crime. D further main-
tained that an affirmative finding of his insanity at the time of the trial
was a due process prerequisite to his indefinite confinement. 7 The Dis-
trict of Columbia District Court rejected this argument and the Court of
Appeals affirmed, finding a "rational connection" between the jury's ver-
dict and D's commitment.' As to D's allegations of recovery, the Court
of Appeals increased the necessary quantum of proof, ruling that a
person of this class must show beyond a reasonable doubt that he has
recovered his sanity and will not be dangerous to himself or to the pub-
lic. The court held that D had not sustained this burden.'
Similar statutes0 prescribing automatic indefinite commitment pre-
viously have been upheld," principally on two rationales. The first is
In a large number of states the defendant has the burden of persuasion on the issue
of insanity. A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity in such a jurisdiction means
that the defendant had sustained his burden by a preponderance of the evidence, i
WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDFNCE § 30 (12th ed. 1955) ; 9 WMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2501
( 3d ed. 1940) and in one state beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Leland, 19o Ore.
598, 227 P.2d 785 (951); aff'd 343 U.S. 790 (195z). However, in all federal
courts the defendant has only the burden of going forward with evidence of insanity.
Davis v. United States, 16o U.S. 469 (1895). More significant is the fact that in the
District of Columbia, the defendant presently need only introduce "some evidence" of
insanity to warrant an instruction on this issue, Tatum v. United States, 1o9 F.2d 612
(D.C. Cir. 195), in contrast to a previous requirement of "evidence sufficient to
create a reasonable doubt as to his mental capacity." Holloway v. United States 148
F.zd 665, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
' Even if the defendant had been found insane at the time of the crime, the test of
whether he should now be confined is whether he is dangerous to himself and to others
at the present time. See Annot., 158 A.L.R. 1220, 1225 (945).
8 Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.zd 943, 948 (D.C. Cir. 196o).
Judge Fahy, in concurring in the result, expressed the opinion that the burden of
proof should not be increased at the present time. Id. at 950.
"0 Eight other jurisdictions presently have automatic commitment statutes. CoLo.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-8-4 (1953)i GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1503 (1953); KAN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 62-1532 (2949); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.19 (1957); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 29-2203 (1956); NEV. REV. STAT. § 275.445 (196o); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2945.39 (Page 1953); WIs. STAT. § 957.11 (1957).
"'People v. D'Angelo, 13 Cal. 2d 2o3, 88 P.2d 708 (1939) ; Hodison v. Rogers, 137
Kan. 950, 22 P.2d 491 (1933) 5 People ex rel. Peabody v. Chanler, 133 App. Div. x59,
[Vol. 196z : 481
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based on a presumption that the insanity continues from the time of the
crime until that of the trial.'2 The use of this presumption can be sus-
tained if there is a rational connection between the jury's verdict and
the ultimate fact presumed-that defendant was insane at the time of
the trial.'" This connection, however, is not present in the District of
Columbia. In that jurisdiction a jury may not be instructed to make
an affirmative finding of insanity at the time of the crime. 4 The pre-
sumption is also weakened because there may be an extensive lapse of
time between the crime and the trial.'5 Furthermore, the fact that the
defendant was mentally competent to stand trial tends to negate the
assumption that immediately following the trial his mental condition
requires prompt indefinite confinement.'6
The Court of Appeals in Ragsdale seemed somewhat responsive to
the weaknesses of the "rational connection" argument and relied on the
second traditional rationale, that automatic commitment is constitutional
because D can question the legality of his detention by habeas corpus.Y1
An argument that sustains original confinement of dubious validity by
117 N.Y. Supp. 322, aff'd 196 N.Y. 525, 89 N.E. xo9 (19o9); in re Brown, 39
Wash. x6o, 81 Pac. 552 (9o5) ; State v. Saffron, 146 Wash. 202, z6z Pac. 970
(1927); contra, Brown v. Urquhart, 139 Fed. 846 (C.C.W.D. Wash. 19o5), rev'd
on other grounds (205 U.S. 179 (907) i Morgan v. State, 179 Ind. 300, 1o N.E. 6
(1913). It has been held that even though the defendant was declared sane just prior
to the criminal trial, he may be automatically committed to an insane asylum for
observation. State v. Burris, 169 La. 520, 535, 125 So. 580, 585 (1929). See gen-
erally Annot., 145 A.L.R. 892 (1943). In addition to the two principal arguments,
support has also been found in the contention that the criminal trial and the verdict are
the equivalent of civil commitment proceedings, In re Clark, 86 Kan. 539, 1z Pac.
492 (1912), and in the argument that the accused knows he will be automatically
committed if he pleads insanity. People ex rel. Peabody v. Baker, 59 Misc. 359, 110
N.Y. Supp. 848 (1908).
"5In re Clark, supra note ii. See generally Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 125 (-953).
"aTot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943) i see generally CORWIN, THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1094 (95.).
", Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 6o8 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
25 Fielding v. United States, 251 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (two years and nine
months lapse) ; Douglas v. United States, 239 F.zd 52 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (two years
lapse).
" It is possible that a person's mental condition would be such that he could stand
trial and yet require hospitalization for a dangerous mental illness, as the legal tests
for the defendant's mental condition at the two times are different. Overholser v. Leach,
257 F.2d 667, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1958). Nevertheless, his mental condition at these times
should be determined by medical examination rather than broadly presumed. See Un-
derwood v. People, 32 Mich. i (1875).
"'People v. Dubina, 304 Mich. 363, 8 N.W.2d 99, cert. denied 319 U.S. 766
(1943)-
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pointing to a means of later release does not seem sound,' particularly
when the petitioner's burden of proof for release is simultaneously in-
creased.'" The vital issue in these cases is whether the petitioner should
have the burden of proof at the release hearing.
When a defendant is acquitted by reason of insanity, considerations
of public safety support automatic commitment for a period reasonably
necessary for a thorough psychiatric examination. Following this
period, due process would seem to require a hearing and an affirmative
finding of a dangerous mental condition at that time if D's detention is
to be continued." It has been argued that because the petitioner has
been acquitted of the only charge against him, the burden of proving a
present dangerous mental condition should be on the committing authori-
ties." Even assuming the burden may be placed on the person confined,
18 The Supreme Court has definitely sanctioned indefinite confinement in a mental
institution for those persons psychiatrically determined to be dangerously mentally ill,
Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366 (1956), but indefinite confinement based
on a presumption is another matter. It was earlier thought that the right to petition
for discharge would reconcile the lack of an original hearing with due process, Ekiu v.
United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892) 5 FREUND, POLICE POWER, § 255 (1904), but per-
haps now an initial invalid confinement will entitle a petitioner to an order of discharge
so far as his present confinement is concerned, even though he might still be mentally
ill. See Barry v. Hall, 98 F.zd 222, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
1" Ragsdale is the only decision found that has announced such a heavy burden.
-°Simon v. Craft, 187 U.S. 427 (19o); Barry v. Hall 98 F.zd 222 (D.C. Cir.
1938). Judge Fahy, in a concurring opinion in Ragsdale, felt that if the person con-
fined did not respond to treatment within a reasonable time, then civil commitment
proceedings would be necessary. Ragsdale v. Overholser, z81 F.2d 943, 949 (D.C. Cir.
596o).
"Brown v. Urquhart, 139 Fed. 846 (C.C.W.D. Wash. 1905), rev"d on other
grounds 205 U.S. i79 (1907). But see Overholser v. Leach, 257 F.2d 667 (D.C.
Cir. 1958). Civil commitment proceedings have been argued to be particularly neces-
sary in the District of Columbia now, as the prosecution has started introducing evi-
dence of mental illness in the criminal trial over the defendant's objections. Halleck,
The Insanity Defense in the District of Columbia-A Legal Lorelei. 49 GEo. L.J. 294
(596o).
A more fundamental argument is that having a criminal trial in addition to a
second hearing or trial to determine the present condition of the accused is very unde-
sirable, as the criminal trial is a waste of time if D is to be committed to a mental
institution in any event, Weihofen, Institutional Treatinent of Persons Acquitted by
Reason of Insanity, 38 TEx L.R. 849 (296o), and the police methods of confinement
have a deleterious effect on the therapeutic treatment to be given the patient. LINDNER
& SELIGER, CORRECTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY, 254- (1947). The above reasons are among
those underlying the philosophy of the Massachusetts Briggs Law, MAss. ANN. LAWS ch.
123 § sooA (1957), which provides for a routine psychiatric examination before the
trial of all persons charged with certain offenses. Such a plan has the merit of de-
tecting mental illness by trained personnel. See Overholser, The Briggs Law of Massa-
chusetts: .4 Reiew and an Appraisal, 25 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 859 (-935).
[Vol. i96i: 481
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his burden of proof certainly should not exceed that of a preponderance
of the evidence."
The aspects of Ragsdale dealing with release raise independent
policy questions as to the procedures involved.23 The release procedure
of the statute was intended by Congress to be initiated only by the men-
tal hospital superintendent's certification that the confined person has
recovered and is no longer dangerous, 24 but a provision for habeas corpus
was believed to be a constitutional necessity.25 The right of habeas
corpus has been somewhat abused in recent years by unceasing petitions
by the same persons.26 As a prior hearing on recovery from mental
illness is not res judicata, another petition may be presented immediately
following the previous hearing. The recurring petition problem has
been partially alleviated by the denial of obviously defective petitions. 8
The court in Ragsdale may have been subtly addressing itself to this
problem of recurring petitions when it increased the petitioner's burden
of proof.29  Under common law habeas corpus doctrine the certificate
of the superintendent is not required for release, but some statutes make
" Most jurisdictions place the burden of persuasion on the person desiring release.
WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note I, at 382.
.' "The procedure for release of insane persons accused, or acquitted, of crime is
unquestionably the weakest link in the entire chain of legal treatment of the problem."
GLUECK, MENTAL DIsoRDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW, 391 (2927).
"' It was felt that whether the confined person had recovered was primarily a psy-
chiatric question. H.R. REP. No. 892, 84 th Cong., ist Sess. 13 (1955).
" See In re Opinion of the Justices, x5i Me. I, 117 A.2d 53 (1955)5 Underwood
v. People, 3z Mich. 1 (1875); State ex rel. Fuller v. Mullinax, 269 S.W.2d 7z (Mo.
1954) ; In re Boyett, 136 N.C. 415, 48 S.E. 789 (1904).
"8A marked increase in habeas corpus petitions has been seen following Walker v.
Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941) in which the Supreme Court made clear that the right
of habeas corpus was not to be taken lightly by the federal judiciary A few persons
submit a large number of applications, and the majority of applications are repeater
petitions. Speck, Statistics on Federal Habeas Corpus, io OHIO ST. L.J. 337 (1949)
see generally, Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171 (.948);
Goodman, Use and Abuse of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 7 F.R.D. 323 (1947).
17 Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224 (1924). The only reasons for which a petition
may be denied without a hearing or without issuing an order to show cause directed to
determine why the petition should not be granted are: (I) even if what is alleged is
true, there can be no relief granted; (-) the request has come too soon after commit-
ment; (3) the petitioner filed as a pauper and he was not a pauper. Tatem v. United
States, 275 F.2d 894, 896 (D.C. Cir. 2960).
. Stewart v. Overholser, 286 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 295o ) ; Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d
857 (D.C. Cir. 945).
2' The court's endeavor seems to be to reasonably quell the ever-growing volume of
haebas corpus petitions and yet heed the mandate of Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275(-94.
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the superintendent's approval an unwavering prerequisite to release.80
It is arguable that Ragsdale is a judicial revision of the District of
Columbia statute to this latter effect.81 While the court may have felt
the additional quantum of proof was necessary in view of a district
court decision in a parallel case,82 the decisions of the District of Colum-
bia District Court do not reflect indifference to public safety. 8
Habeas corpus under this statute is designed to test the judgment of
the hospital authorities, who are prone to assume a protective role
toward society with respect to the release of these persons.84 Yet, con-
sidering the adversary procedure that is followed, the remedy would
seem to be either unsatisfactory from the public's viewpoint or meaning-
less to the petitioner. If the petitioner can afford to hire his own psy-
30 CAL. PEN. CODE § ioz6 (a) (application only at yearly intervals) ; IND. ANN.
STAT. § 9--705 (1933) (first application only after two years, subsequent applications
at five-year intervals) 5 MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 13, § 101 (1957) (acquitted murderers
discharged only by consent of governor) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-24-16 (1953) (ap-
plication only at yearly intervals) ; WASH. REV. CODE § 10.76.070 (i957) (must have
approval of superintendent to petition the court) ; Wis STAT. ANN. § 292.02 (1951)
(habeas corpus not available to acquitted criminals). See GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 23,
at 491. Indeterminate and possibly permanent confinement has been strongly advocated,
but only for those deemed incurably mentally ill. Biocs, THE GuiLwr MIND 194
09ss).
" In accord with the theory that the question of recovery is primarily a psychiatric
one, it has been argued that a confined person of this class should not be released until
psychiatrists certify that he has recovered from his mental illness and is no longer
dangerous. GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 23, at 397. Some writers feel that the psy-
chiatrists alone should be the judge of the readiness for release of such persons, Szazs,
Civil Liberties and Mental Illness-Some Observations on the Case of Miss Edith L.
Hough, 231 J. OF NEKvous AND MENTAL DISEASES 58 (1960). But c.f. Goldstein and
Katz, Dangerousness and Mental Illness, Some Observations on the Decision to Release
Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 YALE L.J. 225 (196o).
For an excellent argument for release to be determined by a commission, see Com-
ment, Releasing Criminal Defendants Acquited and Committed Because of Insanity:
The Need for Balanced Administration, 68 YALE L.J. 293 (1958). But cf. GLUECK,
op. cit. supra note 23, at 441.
"Overholser v. Russell, 283 F.zd 295 (D.C. Cir. 196o). This case is the only
recent case found in which the district court released a confined person without the
superintendent's approval. The case is distinguishable, however, in that the criminal
propensity involved (forgery) was of a non-violent nature and the district court had
had no previous ruling that the same stringent standards for release were to be applied
in all cases under the statute.
"Petitioners in the District of Columbia had found the previous burden of proof
for release quite an imposing barrier without the superintendent's approval. One petition
failed which was approved by every staff psychiatrist connected with the confined person.
In re Rosenfield, 157 F. Supp. i8 (D.D.C. 1957), aff' z6z F.zd 34t (D.C. Cir. 1958) 1
Comment, Releasing Criminal Defendants Acquitted and Comnitted Because of In-
sanity: The Need for Balanced Administration, 68 YALE L.J. 293 (1958).
" Weihofen, supra note 21, at 866.
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chiatrist to rebut the testimony of hospital authorities, the layman judge
is called upon to decide between conflicting scientific opinion. If the
petitioner is a pauper, there is no real contest.
The result of Ragsdale is that persons of a mental condition unde-
termined either judicially or medically are committed for an indefinite
period with an extremely heavy burden of proof for release. 5 In
addition, the habeas corpus hearing does not substantially enlighten the
judge or offer a valid remedy to the person confined. More extensive
use of the trial court's discretion to have the petitioner examined by
neutral government psychiatrists would seem to be one method of
fulfilling the purpose of the habeas corpus remedy without further legis-
lation, at least in the District of Columbia. 6  This would provide a
better balance between traditional notions of due process and uncon-
trolled power in the hands of psychiatric staffs of mental institutions.
"A by-product of Ragsdale will doubtless be the obsolescence of the plea of in-
sanity in noncapital cases in the District of Columbia. The statute has already been
changed to make it more difficult for the accused to get a mental examination. D.C.
CODE ANN. § 24-30 (a) (Supp. 1958). The judge now can order an examination
only when a prima facie case of mental illness is presented. See Comment, Insanity and
the Criminal Law in the District of Columbia, 44 GEo. L.J. 489 (1956). Such a
change reflects a desire to inflict punishment on the individual and not let him "get off"
with an insanity plea. A better reasoned statute would concern itself with the indi-
viduaPs social dangerousness rather than his moral culpability, and would thus con-
centrate on detecting mental illness among criminals, as penal confinement is certainly
not a deterrent to crimes caused by mental illness. See WEIHOFEN, TIH URGE TO
PUNISH 136 (1956); BIGGS, op. cit. supra note 30, at x64, 19 5 GLUECK, op. Cit. supra
note 23, at 555 Glueck, Psychiatric Examination of Persons Accused of Crime, 36 YALE
L.J. 632 (1927).
o The Court of Appeals has made it clear that the district court has the authority to
call on the Commission of Mental Health for assistance in this regard, but this plan
does not seem to have been often advocated by counsel. De Marcos v. Overholser, 137
F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 320 U.S. 785 (1943). The court regarded such a
plan as part of a nationwide movement to give courts the assistance of unbiased experts.
See Dession, Psychiatry and the Conditioning of Criminal Justice, 47 YALE L.J. 329
(1938).
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